NOTES

Divided We Fall: Associational Standing and Collective Interest
To invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, an individual plaintiff must have suffered a legally cognizable injury. 1 In the case of a plaintiff that is an association, rather than a single individual, current doctrine defines a legally cognizable injury in two ways. Standing will be accorded to an association if (1) some or all of the association's members have suffered individual injury, or (2) the association, likened to a single person, has suffered an injury comparable to one to which an individual could be vulnerable. 2 Each of these approaches reduces the interest the association seeks to protect to an interest that can be construed individualistically, or atomistically. 3 Such a conception interprets both interests and persons in a particular way. First, legally cognizable interests are located within and defined with reference to individual persons. Second, these persons -whether they be actual single human agents or other entities fictionalized as suchare regarded as irrevocably distinct from one another, the bearers of private, competing concems. 2. For a full discussion of current associational standing doctrine, see infra Part I. 3. The terms "atomistic" and "atomistically" refer to a conception of persons and their interests that portrays persons as isolated "atoms." On this view, persons are like isolated particles, perhaps able to co-exist successfully if external conditions permit, but never able to achieve any unity or solidarity. See c. TAYLOR, Atomism, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 187 (1985) .
4. In well-known standing cases of the 1960s and 1970s, courts relying on this model denied standing to the individual plaintiffs who sued as citizens because their injuries were not distinct from the harm suffered by other citizens. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (citizen alleged violation of the incompatibility clause because some members of Congress also held positions in military reserves); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (taxpayer alleged violation of article I because the public budget of the CIA was not itemized, an omission of "statement anci accounting"). The taxpayer and citizen plaintiffs in these cases argued that as individuals whom the law regards as taxpayers or citizens, they possessed specific interests that the government injured. The Supreme Court, however, found it rather easy to reject this line of reasoning because the Court has traditionally viewed the judiciary as the arbiter of disputes between the claims of private individual persons. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 174-75, 179 (recommending that the legislature provide the forum for taxpayers and citizens to argue their concerns against the government).
The sort of argument underlying Schlesinger and Richardson assumes that the property of having suffered a distinct injury supposedly separates a litigant from the rest of the populace, and concludes that without a distinct injury a prospective litigant may not invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court. See generally J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 145 (1978) (explaining the rationale behind equating injury and unique identity). Working from the premise that a personal injury distinguishes a litigant from the general population, it follows that a citizen or taxpayer cannot invoke standing based on a claim staked on taxpayer or citizen identity. In fact, asserting the 733 [Vol. 87:733 Unfortunately for plaintiff-associations, many interests adopted by associations do not fit this atomistic model. For example, interests in a clean environment or an ongoing system of unemployment benefits express social or public concerns that do not reduce easily to the interest of any one person. 5 Despite the acknowledged importance of such concerns, 6 current standing doctrine denies them judicial protection. Associations often seek to redress injuries to interests that can only be understood nonatomistically, yet current associational standing retains an allegiance to the individualistic model of interest. This prevents courts from redressing an injury to any interest best modelled as a collective one. Often, such interests take shape just because a group of people form an association to share a joint concern. Alone, no one member embodies the interest at stake, but in banding together all of the members create a vehicle that does possess a distinct, potentially vulnerable interest. The association serves as such a vehicle not because it is like any single individual -no single individual bears the association's interest -but specifically because it is unlike an individual. 7 Although courts acknowledge the existence and advantages of association, the lack of a coherently articulated conception of collective interest prevents realization of the benefits of association within the legal system. The tension in the judicial system between acknowledging these benefits and sticking to an atomistic model of interest manifests itself in inconsistent grants of associational standing. Even when faced with interests that the Supreme Court has articulated as legitimate for associations to represent, some courts have relied on the atomistic model of interest to deny associational standing. 8 In the end, current doctrine weakens the ability of associations to litigate efinterest of a taxpayer or citizen presupposes that the rest of the populace shares the interest in question. Since all other adults are taxpayers and/or citizens, a claim based on these identities serves only to demarcate the taxpayers or citizenry from the government, not from one another. Thus, this sort of argument would deny standing to taxpayer-plaintiffs and to citizen-plaintiffs.
This argument, however, contains an odd feature. The government itself does not seem to be the sort of atomistic individual the Court required the plaintiffs in these cases to be. "The government" includes people who are citizens and taxpayers, but enjoys a legal identity of its own. By accepting the government as a litigant, courts already acknowledge a potential plaintiff whose injuries do not demarcate it as a single, isolated agent, comparable to a single human being. The government itself provides a paradigm of an entity that cannot be construed atomistically.
5. For discussion of the inapplicability of the atomistic interpretation to such interests, see infra Part I and notes 69-77 and accompanying text. fectively by forcing them to filter their claims through the traditional, atomistic model of interest. Some legitimate associational claims, however, cannot survive this process. Real collective interests worthy of judicial protection fall by the wayside for want of a framework to accommodate them.
This Note asserts that associations merit standing when they seek to litigate collective interests they reasonably claim as theirs. Part I of this Note examines the state of judicial doctrine on associational standing, and illustrates how current doctrine hampers associations by refusing to recognize, and thus protect, interests that fit naturally with those the Supreme Court has regarded as associational. Part II reworks the concept of associational standing by formalizing collective interest and arguing for the association as the appropriate legal representative of such interest. Finally, Part III addresses the separation of powers concerns raised by a reworked concept of associational standing, and concludes that the suggested concept contributes to the uniqueness of the judiciary's role rather than encroaching on the legislature's domain.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING 9 A. Supreme Court Doctrine
The Supreme Court has recently embraced the concept of associational standing. 10 In UAW v. Brock, 11 the Court stated:
9. Federal courts award standing to associations on two grounds, as organizations in their own rights ("organizational standing") and as representatives of members' interests · ("representational standing"). See supra note 4. Recent developments have concerned representational associational standing, the type reconsidered in this Note. This Note does not address organizational associational standing because such standing does not concern collective interests.
Representational standing offers the possibility of recognizing that although associations may be composed of individuals with their own legal identities as members, and may have legally individual identities themselves, they are the bearers of interests that are irreducibly collective. See infra Part II.A. Organizational standing treats the association as a single individual and recognizes that it can suffer harms structurally equivalent to those suffered by any legal individual. Associational interests of this sort do not require the rearticulation suggested here because they fit comfortably within the traditional atomistic view of interest. There are instances, however, where it seems a court will force an association's claim into the organizational category to sidestep the issue of the collective interest. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982) .
In Havens, a residential counseling association objected to the racial steering practices of an apartment complex. The association sought standing on both organizational and representational grounds. Without reaching the latter contention, the Court granted the former, stating that it would "conduct the same inquiry as in the case of an individual," 455 U.S. at 378, and concluding that the actions of the complex could drain the organization's resources and impair its ability to advise apartment-seekers effectively. 455 U.S. at 379. Given the recent and regular confusion about when to grant individuals standing, the efficacy of likening associational standing to individual standing seems doubtful. tion failed to show that any particular member would be individually harmed by recreational development of federal parkland. The Sierra Club refused to send a token member through the parkl~nd, thus laying the groundwork for a claim of individual deprivation of the park's natural beauty, precisely because the Club wanted to argue for preservation of the area as a shared natural resource. 19 The dissenting justices recognized the disingenuousness of demanding that environmental cases be litigated on the basis of ad hoc individualistic claims, particularly in the face of legitimate associational interests. 20 The deceptiveness of the individual standing requirement as a test of legitimate interest becomes overwhelmingly apparent in the reasoning of a later environmental case, United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure (''SCRAP''). 21 There, the Court awarded representational standing to a newly formed association of five law students, who sued a federal agency for granting a fee increase to railroads. The students claimed that the rate increase threatened each of their individual interests by (1) increasing the costs of inexpensive bottled and packaged goods, because the added shipping costs for transporting used bottles and packaging to recycling centers would be passed along to them as consumers; and (2) interfering with their use of natural resources in a given area for recreational and aesthetic purposes. 22 In fact, the case concerned the environmental impact of effectively raising the cost of recycling, but because SCRAP willingly translated their claim into atomistic terms, the Court granted standing to an "environmental association" far less established than the Sierra Club 23 to vindicate an environmental injury far less obvious than the one threatened in the Sierra Club case . . Although the association-plaintiffs in both Sierra Club and SCRAP reacted differently to the necessity of satisfying the individual standing requirement, these associations did have the option of protecting a collective interest by creating a sufficiently related individual interest. In this manner, protecting the "dummy" individual interest would suffice to protect the underlying collective concern. Additionally, both the Sierra Club and SCRAP could create the requisite individual injury at little cost to the associations themselves. In other cases, however, the very collectiveness of the injury precludes the use of this ploy because it will be in no single individual's interest to risk playing the tester's role, particularly if it involves more than sending a member for a stroll through the park. 24 Aside from its susceptibility to reliance on token individual plaintiffs, the first Hunt criterion creates another type of confusion for associational standing doctrine. The doctrine of individual standing suffers from a controversy over just how personal an injury must be to qualify the plaintiff for standing. By assimilating the requirements for associational standing into the requirements for individual standing, plaintiff-associations become mired in the same controversy. 25 The 490 (1975) . In Warth, the Supreme Court introduced the individual injury requirement in denying standing to, among others, an association of firms engaged in residential construction. This association claimed injury by the exclusive zoning practices of a town planning board, but the Court refused to recognize the injury because the association could not produce a member who had sought a low-income housing building permit from the board and been denied. 422 U.S; at 516. No firm, however, would attempt to acquire a permit because of the large investment necessary in making a presentation to the board. Yet the zoning board's practices clearly indicated denial of any permit for low-income housing. The members of the association had a shared, collective interest in changing the town's zoning practices, but no single firm had an interest in being the token: the collective nature of the injury effectively thwarted any individual response by removing individual incentive to challenge the zoning practices. 30. 468 U.S. at 756-57. Writing for a divided Court, Justice O'Connor asserted: "Recognition of standing in such circumstances would transform the federal courts into 'no more than a vehicle for the vindication of value interests of concerned bystanders.'" 468 U.S. at 756 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687). In his dissent, Justice Brennan made the point that the black parents seeking standing were more than "concerned bystanders" and had, in fact, suffered a "distinct" and "palpable" injury. 468 U.S. at 770, 773 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor failed to recognize that judicial formulation of societal values pervades the however, would recognize that the black parents as-a group had a legitimate representational interest in government behavior that increased the segregation of schools, whether or not any single member could have brought suit against the government. Such a group might possess, and choose to represent, an interest not reducible to, or captured by, an individual atomistic interest. 31 The first Hunt criterion is not the only one to sneak atomism into the foundation of representational standing. The third criterion, the test of whether the claim or relief requires individual participation in the lawsuit, 32 can also work to defeat an associational claim of interest. This test can always reintroduce atomism by requiring individual members to testify if their atomistic interests diverge from the collective interest. 33 However, possible diversity of members' interests at an atomistic level does not negate the possibility of an associational commitment to the protection of one another's interests. In this sense, people can share interests they would not regard themselves as having were it not for their relation to other people -as when a gameplayer reports his own inadvertent cheating because he shares an interest with his opposite number: the integrity of the game. Either player could "testify" to this interest. In fact, to understand fully the integrity of the game is to recognize this. But the third criterion of the Hunt test eliminates recognition of this type of mutual interest or testimony and would, in effect, only recognize the harm to the cheated player. If we take membership seriously as a phenomenon, the collective interest belongs both to the association and to each member insofar as she is part of the association.
The hurdles raised by the three-pronged test prevent associations from doing exactly what the Supreme Court identified as an important function in UAW v. Brock: 34 to vindicate the members' shared interest through litigation. 35 The Brock Court granted standing to the UAW concept of injury sufficient to merit standing: deciding that a particular type of harm and type of victim qualifies for standing indicates a value considered worthy of protection by societal mechanisms. This idea of the judiciary's role differs radically from that which explains courts as the mechanisms that replace combat in the case of interpersonal disputes. 36. 477 U.S. at 282-88. The Secretary of Labor contended that because the union was not seeking actual unemployment benefits but was instead asserting the unlawfulness of the regulation, it could not demonstrate the possibility of individual standing. 477 U.S. at 283-84. This type of argument parallels that used successfully against the plaintiffs in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), see supra note 30 and accompanying text. However, the Brock Court rejected this argument because union members potentially affected by the regulations had a "live interest" in the litigation, 477 U.S. at 284, and "a direct challenge" by the union was "not only proper, but appropriate." 477 U.S. at 286. The Court easily found grounds for union standing on the second Hunt criterion, germaneness of the organization's purpose to the lawsuit, because the union's constitution stated among its purposes an effort to work for legislation implementing an effective system of federal unemployment insurance. 477 U.S. 286-87.
The Secretary contended that the union's claim required the individual participation of members whose finances would be variously injured because of the Department's regulations. But since the union's claim did not concern particular benefits owed to any member, the Court dismissed this argument. 477 U.S. 287-88.
37. 477 U.S. at 288. Significantly, the Court recognized the prior collective organization of an established association, as opposed to the contingent nature of the aggregation of class action plaintiffs:
The Secretary's presentation, however, fails to recognize the special features, advantageous both to the individuals represented and to the judicial system as a whole, that distinguish suits by associations on behalf of their members from class actions. While a class action creates an ad hoc union of injured plaintiffs who may be linked only by their common claims, an association suing to vindicate the interests of its members can draw upon a preexisting reservoir of expertise and capital.
477 U.S. at 289. The Court's comments distinguish between a truly collective entity and an ad hoc union, despite the emphasis on the atomistic benefits of association for members, rather than an emphasis on the possibility that only associations represent genuinely common claims. 42 the Court granted representational standing to the NAACP when it sought to assert the privacy rights of its members, calling the association "the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views. " 43 Tension is thus evident between these earlier hints at the concept of interest underlying association -interests the Court continues to recognize -and the Court's latest articulation of the requirements for representational standing. The individualistic requirements of the Hunt test require a conception of association that does not jibe with an idea of association as a medium that blends individual interests into an independent shared interest -as the NAACP v. Alabama Court suggested. Similarly, the Hunt concept does not support the claim that an . association more effectively vindicates shared interests because associational and shared interests mutually constitute one another -as Justice Jackson implied. Part II of this Note demonstrates structural reasons for the inconsistency between the two views of association and collective interest. The remainder of this section reveals the confusion this tension has created at the appellate level.
B. Representational Standing in the Appellate Courts
Each of the Hunt criteria has been interpreted differently by the different courts of appeals, and the decision in Brock seems to have done little to inspire convergence. The difference between the First Circuit and the D.C. Circuit regarding the requirement of individual standing, the first prong of the Hunt test, reveals the tremendous ambiguity created by this criterion. In a case tailor-made for satisfying the Hunt criteria, Camel Hair and Cashmere Institute, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 44 the First Circuit relied on Brock's "strong endorsement" 45 in granting representational standing to a five-member association of cashmere merchant firms. In Camel Hair, the association sued a manufacturer for overstating the amount of cashmere in its products. Because any one of the firms could have sought injunctive relief against the manufacturer in the interest of preserving the reputation of cashmere, the court held that the association met the first of the Hair, yet concerning a union interest arguably similar to that in Brock-the D.C. Circuit maintained that the association had run afoul of the first requirement of the Hunt test. The court denied standing to unions seeking to ensure that the government adhered to regulations governing wage determinations when awarding jobs to private contractors. While recognizing that the government's irregular procedure might have reduced the overall number of positions available, the court nonetheless held that the union could not show a causal connection between the procedure and the loss of employment by any particular member. 48 Thus, the court refused to grant standing on the basis relied upon in Brock: that the union had the right to protect a shared interest (in this case, maintenance of job positions) not easily framed in atomistic terms.
Despite the difference in result between Camel Hair 49 and National Maritime Union, so both courts of appeals cast their decisions according to the aggregative concept of association exemplified in the Hunt decision.st The courts decided these cases according to the ease with which the interests of the associations could be reduced to individual interests, with the First Circuit applying a liberal construction of Hunt, and the D.C. Circuit a stringent one. Such latitude for discretion defeats the practical realization of the Brock Court's endorsement of associational standing for the sake of collective action: "[T]he doctrine of associational standing recognizes that the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others. 'The only practical judicial policy . . . is to permit the association . . . to vindicate the interests of all.' "S2
Because the second prong of Hunt ascertains whether the association's interest is germane to its overall purpose, organizations typically meet this test easily by reference to their organizational constitutions or their statements of purpose in bringing suit. support for its claim that protection of unemployment benefits was germane to the union's pur-for the courts, however, has been deciding whether diversity among the interests of members overrides statements of associational purpose, thus preventing an association from satisfying the third Hunt requirement. This prong of the Hunt test rules out representational standing when a case would require individual participation or proof of the relevant interests. 54 In cases where members are diverse or not similarly situated against the defendant, the Eighth Circuit has denied standing even in the face of an admittedly legitimate associational interest. 55 The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, has taken Brock as the definitive statement on representational standing and has refused to regard diversity among member interests as a bar to standing when a legitimate collective claim is asserted. 56 The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have also applied the third Hunt criterion liberally. Like the D.C. Circuit, these courts relied on the rationale that member diversity should be discounted since members expect to incur some costs in the course of associating. 57 pose); Camel Hair, 199 F.2d at 11 ("As harm to the reputation of cashmere is precisely the kind of harm the plaintiff corporation was designed to prevent, the requirement that the suit be germane to the association's purposes is clearly met here." Court appeared to deal with the problem of conflicting interests by saying that associational standing was too valuable to jettison and offering possible safeguards for members whose interests were adverse to the litigating position taken by the association." In National Maritime, the D.C. Circuit also gave its own rationale for rejecting member diversity as a bar to representational standing: because internal conflicts are endemic to associations, members expect to incur certain costs to their own interests upon joining. Courts can entertain injured members' challenges to the association's internal procedures for determining which interests to litigate -but so long as these procedures were predetermined and followed, the court will uphold standing. assertion of conflict arising from diversity of members was "speculative and indirect"; such conflict is the association's concern, not the court's). The court explained:
Virtually any relief involving the expenditure of money that benefits some but not all of an organization's members potentially means that that money will be unavailable to or in part exacted from the remainder of the membership. By joining an organization dedicated to a particular goal in the public interest, members indicate a willingness to make certain sacrifices productive of that goal. Carried to its logical extreme, evaluation of representational standing in terms of the adverseness of remote interests of discrete members would seriously [Vol. 87:733 These discrepancies between and within the courts of appeals indicate the difficulties of applying representational standing doctrine without a clear understanding of the sort of interests uniquely suited to associational representation. Courts need a concept of a collective interest that lends itself to consistent grants of associational standing and prevents standing from becoming a tool for predisposing of cases on the merits. 58 A reformed test would obviate the need for artificially produced token injuries to individuals 59 and would avoid the reduction of associational claims to individual claims. 60 A concept of collective interest that alleviates these discrepancies would justify the distinctive characterization of associational standing developed in Brock
II. FROM REPRESENTATIONAL TO COLLECTIVE STANDING
In discussing and awarding representational standing, the courts have recognized that members of associations possess shared resources, 61 shared problems, 62 and shared self-understandings. 63 Yet current doctrine denies associations a legal identity that would truly afford an opportunity to litigate common problems using common resources. To effectuate the virtues of associational standing, courts need a framework that will inform the recognition of such virtues by articulating a definition of what it means for resources, problems, and undermine the ability of individuals through organizations to achieve public interest objec· tives through the legal system. 759 F.2d at 572-73. See also NCAA v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1980) (diver· sity of member interests is a reality of association and a cost members accept; where its members have conflicting interests, an association must demonstrate to court fairness of procedure in decision to litigate).
58 61. See Brock, 411 U.S. at 289 (unlike class action plaintiffs, an associational plaintiff "can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital"); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (in associations "people pool their capital, their interests, or their activities under a name and form that will identify collective interests").
62. See Brock, 477 U.S. at 290 ("the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207 (1961) (association of voters sought "relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of their own, and of those similarly situated") (emphasis added).
63. See Brock, 477 U.S. at 290 ("The very forces that cause individuals to band together in an association will thus provide some guarantee that the association will work to promote their interests."); National Maritime Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 1228, 1233-34 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (because members of associations have thrown in their lots to· gether, they expect and accept certain costs to individual self-interest).
self-understandings to be "shared" or "common." This framework should yield a concept of collective standing that succeeds in capturing those legitimate associational interests that representational standing cannot. Subsection A of this Part. identifies the structure of a collective good, and the type of interest to which such a structure gives rise. The existence of such a structure and its attendant interests provides the ground for collective standing. Subsection B explicates the reasons for awarding collective standing to associations rather than individuals.
A. The Interest of a Collectivity
In its purest form, a collectivity provides an identity distinct from that of its individual members, an identity that makes sense only in the context of the members' relationship to one another and to other actors in the social world. The collectivity then can further interests that atomistic agents, acting in isolation, cannot. Collectivities can thus be understood both in terms of these interests and in terms of their structure and function in contemporary society. This subsection focuses on the formal character of a collective interest and indicates the collectivity's alignment with the protection of such an interest. One familiar example of a collectivity is the labor union: once organized, workers share in an identity separate from and irreducible to their identities as isolated employees. In fact, the union identity diverges from the individual identities. An effort to form an illegal union -say in an industry in which unionization is prohibited -illustrates this. Imagine that an upstart union calls a strike to pressure the employer into recognizing the union and negotiating higher wage rates. During the course of the job action strikers will not be paid -and if the action fails, participating workers will not be rehired. Striking, therefore, poses some risk to participants. For the strike to be effective, the owner's business must be hobbled. Achieving this effect, however, does not require that absolutely every employee refuse to work, only a number sufficient to cripple operations. Thus, the optimal strategy for each isolated employee is to report to work (remaining on payroll and ensuring her job post-strike) while betting that enough workers dedicated to unionization will strike successfully (harming the owner's interests enough to gain recognition of the union in return for resuming work). 64 Of course, if each employee realizes this strategy, the union's 64. This situation presents a classic free-rider problem. Free-rider problems arise when a good can be provided at no cost to any individual who fails to contribute so long as most or all of the other agents do contribute. One common illustration is that of a lawn that a group wishes to keep untrammeled. A single person taking a short-cut across the lawn will not wear a path in the grass, but if everybody takes the shortcut, soon there will be only dirt. If each single person assumes she can cross with impunity (say, )Vhen nobody else is looking), everybody will end up crossing, defeating attainment of the desired public good: an untrammeled lawn. For further examples and a discussion of the difficulties in coordinating collective action, see R. LEMPERT & [Vol. 87:733 effort to organize and strike will disintegrate, precisely because its interest cannot be reduced to those of isolated employees. 65 In more formal terms, the relations between workers themselves, and between workers and the collective goal, serve to defeat the attempt to unionize. This structure is known as a Prisoner's Dilemma. The Prisoner's Dilemma appears in a number of forms, including the following.
Two prisoners are known to be guilty of a very serious crime, but there is not enough evidence to convict them. There is, however, sufficient evidence to convict them of a minor crime. The District Attorney . . . separates the two and tells each that [he] will be given the option to confess if [he wishes] to. If both of them do confess, they will be.convicted of the major crime on each other's evidence, but in view of the good behavior shown in squealing, the District Attorney will ask for a penalty of ten years each rather than the full penalty of twenty years. If neither confesses, each will be convicted only of the minor crime and get two years. If one confesses and the other does not, then the one who does confess will go free and the other will go to prison for twenty years.
Each prisoner sees that it is definitely in his interest to confess no matter what the other does. If the other confesses, then by confessing himself this prisoner reduces his own sentence from twenty years to ten. If the other does not confess, then by confessing he himself goes .free rather than getting a two-year sentence. So each prisoner feels that no matter what the other does it is always better for him to confess. So both of them do confess guided by rational self-interest, and each goes to prison for ten years. 66 J. SANDERS (1985) . Offe argues that contemporary West German unions confront an increasing diversity of member interests due to the differences in socioeconomic status of workers. He argues that unions can maintain solidarity only by strengthening their identities through addressing issues beyond wage rates, including qualitative concerns with both workplace and politics. See id. at 164-69. This amounts to a broadening of the range of issues considered collective. Perhaps the widening scope of issues associational plaintiffs seek to litigate reflects a similar trend. To ensure protection of collective goods, some have suggested that courts grant standing to entities more alien to the law than associations. See, e.g., C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? (1974) (arguing that the best way to protect interests in the environment would be to confer "rights" on natural entities and allow for their direct representation). The scenario demonstrates that it is strategically rational for each player to confess regardless of what the other does. But, if both confess, as the aggregation of individual rational choice would have it, they are worse off (ten-year sentences) than if neither did (two-year sentences). From the outside of the Prisoner's Dilemma, we can see that if A and B both adopt the strategy that makes sense from each of their individual perspectives ("confess"), each will be worse off than if each chose not to confess. It might seem plausible to think both prisoners can also discern this before they actually choose a strategy. But, even if each knows the other will come to this realization, the Dilemma cannot be resolved; for, just at the moment A realizes that B perceives the problem, and thus the benefits of the strategy "don't confess," it becomes all the more individually rational for A to choose the strategy "confess," and receive no sentence at all. The collective solution is highly unstable. In the union example, each member· occupies the place of one of the prisoners. Like the prisoners, the union members share a necessarily common problem: they cannot achieve the best outcome for the group if each aims toward the best outcome for himself. Both prisoners and workers require an escape from the disintegrative pattern into which they seem locked; they need access to a new conception of their relationship to one another, so that they may cooperatively address 67. Id.
[Vol. 87:733 their common concerns. A collectivity supplies the perspective from which to do this. By forming a union and regarding themselves as members, as well as employees, workers give themselves reason to participate in union activities and to trust that others will not free ride. 68 To understand membership from the collective perspective is to realize that it is incompatible with free riding.
Any effort to attain a common good, such as the workers' attempt to better conditions for the entire labor force, is vulnerable to collective action problems. 69 Other examples of common goods range from a well-played game to language itself -goods that cannot be known nor had alone. 70 More relevant, perhaps, to the legal context are socalled public goods. 71 These include parks 72 and a clean environment, 73 roads and sewers, 74 a governmental system of unemployment 68. See R. LEMPERT & J. SANDERS, supra note 64, at 321 n.28. Lempert and Sanders give a rather unsympathetic account of possible techniques unions may use to encourage workers to adopt a collective perspective. They suggest that "propaganda," "normative appeals," and "coercion" are particularly effective, and hence widely used, techniques.
69. The notion of a "common good" has been extended to phenomena not usually characterized as "goods." On this view, not only are certain goods necessarily shared or social -any action whatsoever is, in fact, social. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Kenneth Arrow states:
[A]ll significant actions involve joint participation of many individuals. Even the apparently simplest act of individual decision involves the participation of a whole society.
It is important to note that this observation tells us all non-trivial actions are essentially the property of society as a whole, not of individuals. It is quite customary to think of each individual as being able to undertake actions on his own .... Formally, a social action is then taken to be the resultant of all individual actions. In other words, any social action is thought of as being factored into a sequence of individual actions .
. . . PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 15 (1985) (arguing that social science must study intersubjective and common meanings to understand human life because language constitutes social reality).
Additionally, a collective itself is a collective good -it cannot be known or had alone. 71. Technically, "public goods" is an economic term used to describe those goods that cannot be provided for one person without providing them for everybody. In the legal context, disputes often arise when the provision of these goods depends upon the contributions of all those who will partake of them. insurance,7 5 and an integrated society. 76 Maintaining any of these goods requires the cooperation of everybody -or alm:ost everybody -who partakes of them. And, as the cases demonstrate, people db form and join collectivities to achieve, sustain, and protect such goods. 77 As illustrated in this section, a collective interest differs in structure from an individual interest. It can be understood as an interest susceptible to free riding or to the collective self-defeat manifested in the outcome of a Prisoner's Dilemma. When collective organizations possess such interests, they may suffer a unique injury, either because a specifically collective interest or good is threatened, or because the collectivity itself is threatened. 78 The criterion for collective ·standing ought to be that the plaintiff-association seeks to protect an interest that is identifiably collective and therefore not equivalent to any atomistic interests.
B. Awarding Associations Collective Standing
Aside from serving identifiably collective interests, associations also manifest the distinct nature of a collectivity by virtue of their internal organization and their societal role. These characteristics differentiate the association from other legal actors, thereby demonstrating that it is worthy of standing to protect interests specific to the association. Because associations possess unique identities related to the protection of collective interests, and because isolated individuals are insufficiently related to such issues, courts should award and limit collective standing to associations.
When collectives seek to solve problems regarding shared goods, they face concerns pertinent exclusively to themselves, rather than to any single individual. 79 The collective possesses its own identity. This identity may grow from members' relationships to one another and the members' relationships to nonmembers, but it is distinct from members' individual identities and singular concerns. 80 Modern corporate [Vol. 87:733 law recognizes this by defining a corporation as a legal person, apart from its directors, shareholders, and employees. 81 Labor law also acknowledges distinctive collective identity by institutionalizing the status of unions. 82 Ostensibly, the law in these areas has responded to the reality of contemporary social life: business and labor require definitively collective identities to pursue their goals. 83 The law has also noted that people associate to pursue noneconomic aims, recognizing the efficacy of collective action in these areas. 84 This recognition of the unique societal position associations occupy should be the basis for a correlatively significant legal role: regarding associations as the exclusive bearers of collective standing. 85 Id. at 308 (emphasis added); see also J. VINING, supra note 4, at 156-57 (1978) (explaining the concept of a legal identity that is distinct from individual human beings' identities). Contempo· rary systems theory generates a similar point:
If If the majority, even an overwhelming majority, of the individuals associated with an institution wish to define its interests and change its purposes to reflect another aspect of their concern, they may, depending upon the rules of the institution, be utterly unable to do so ... ·• This is the orthodoxy of the law of organization .
•.
• The embarrassing facts of the large modem corporation or the multinational corporation -that control over its voice is secured and transferred quite without regard to its vast membership, and equity investment is treated as merely one among many of a number of sources of capital to be maintained to the degree necessary but no more -do not fit standard conceptual models, but do confirm Courts can refine their selection of which associations to recognize as the representatives of particular collective interests according to an association's degree of formal organization 86 and demonstrated COJDmitment to the claimed interest. 87 A stronger requirement along these lines might prevent the type of anomaly produced when the Supreme Court denied standing to the Sierra Club, 88 a long-established environmental protection group, and awarded it to SCRAP, 89 a group formed hastily to litigate a single environmental issue. To delineate collective standing, courts could require that the history of the association and its activities display an investment of resources, financial and otherwise, in the interest asserted. Due to the nature of a collective good, 90 an injury to that good cannot damage a single individual's interest. 91 Because a collective good consists in being shared among people, those individuals also (1985) . Doernberg treats as collective the interests at stake in taxpayer and citizen standing suits, and argues that an individual citizen deserves standing to redress injury to such interests. His view seems more prey to separation-ofpowers concerns than does collective standing. See infra Part III.A. [Vol. 87:733 share the harm of any impediment to its achievement. No single person can claim the injury as one to him alone. 92 Since a personal connection to the injury claimed remains one of the general prerequisites to standing, 93 the fact that injuries to collective goods cannot damage any one individual's interest requires that a collectivity such as an association, rather than a single person, be the possessor of collective standing. 94 Notwithstanding the structural incongruity of assigning collective standing to single individuals, membership in an association may create a sufficient connection between a particular individual and a collective injury to justify a grant of collective standing to a single member. Although plausible, this alternative misconstrues the nature of participation in a collectivity. Amartya Sen draws a distinction juxtaposing two possible characterizations of the motives for membership:
[We] must distinguish between two separate concepts: (i) sympathy and (ii) commitment. The former corresponds to the case in which the concern for others directly affects one's own welfare. If the knowledge of torture of others makes you sick, it is a case of sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally worse off, but you think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is a case of commitment. 95 If people joined associations solely on the basis of sympathy, they would cooperate with one another in order to further their own individual interests. 96 In the case of a union, this would imply that the members all feel for one another. Each, therefore, behaves so as to better one another's lot because if others are better off, then, in turn, the participant himself will be better off. This puts a tremendous 92. Recall Rawls' example of ballplayers seeking a good play of the game, supra note 70 at 525-26. Cheating interferes with this collective good, which is possible only if all the players participate fairly and wholeheartedly. No one person could play a ballgame by herself, let alone achieve a good play of the game. Accordingly, no one person suffers alone when somebody cheats; rather, the play of the game, shared by all, suffers. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) .
94. This argument resembles those espoused in cases where the Supreme Court denied standing to individual citizens claiming injury to general interests. The Court objected that such plaintiffs had not differentiated themselves sufficiently from the entire public. Thus, the Court reasoned, the plaintiffs could not define their injury in a manner that would ensure concrete presentation of the relevant issues. Mere concern for the principles at stake did not constitute an 67-68 (1979) (distinction between substantive rationality in which an agent acts to achieve "given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions and constraints" and procedural rationality, which is "the outcome of appropriate deliberation"); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE at 182-83 (1982) .
96. As the Supreme Court noted in UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986) , this conception matches more nearly the nature of a class action suit.
weight on the empathy and altruism -the sympathy -of union members. If this seems farfetched in the union case, altruism and empathy appear to be even more unlikely motives for members of associations concerned, for example, with parks far from their homes. Even if members do have some sympathetic motivation for associating and participating in associational activities, free rider situations 97 demonstrate that even a sympathetic member will often choose not to participate if she realizes her contribution would be marginal.9 8 Sympathy, it seems, fails to motivate the participation necessary for creating and protecting a common interest.
Rather, joining and participating in an association suggests that members are willing to "do something" -pay dues, strike, distribute pamphlets -about the association's collective goals from motives other than the possibility of personal utility gains. 99 Rather, members display a commitment to the collective aims pursued by the association, and to the collectivity itself. They can be expected to understand the nature of such a commitment. Courts have understood this in granting representational standing to associations despite potential divergence of individual members' interests from those of the association.100 These decisions regard membership not as a personal connection to the injury sought to be redressed, but as an indication of the members' own recognition of the aptness of a joint pursuit of a collective interest. Taking a cue from these cases, courts should rely on the members' perceptible commitment as justification for granting collective standing to the association.
C. Applying a Doctrine of Collective Standing
Regardless of one's personal preference for or against collective action, the proposed reformulation of associational standing -collective standing -has two practical advantages over the Hunt model. First, collective standing accords with the theoretical justifications re-97. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
As social philosopher Jon Bister explains:
[T]here can be no way of justifying the substantive assumption that all forms of altruism, solidarity and sacrifice really are ultra-subtle forms of self-interest, except by the trivializing gambit of arguing that people have concern for others because they want to avoid being distressed by their distress. And even this gambit ... is open to the objection that rational distress-minimizers could often use more efficient means than helping others. J. EtsrER, SOUR GRAPES 10 (1983) .
99. This is not to deny that unionized workers receive personal utility gains because of unionization. When compared with the gains of free-riding (receiving union benefits without participating in membership activities), these gains do not, however, suffice to explain membership. A motive other than personal utility must be attributed to those members who do not free-ride in order to understand their behavior. The first advantage of the proposed reformulation of associational standing is its consistency with the Supreme Court's theoretical justification for associational standing set out in Brock In Brock, the Court granted standing to the UAW in order for the union to protest a Department of Labor regulation that resulted in the denial of supplementary unemployment benefits to displaced union members.104 As emphasized previously, 105 the Court justified its decision in terms of the unique nature of associational standing, which acknowledges that "the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others." 106 This Note has already argued that the Hunt test (basing associational standing on individual standing) defeats this justification for associational standing. 107 Collective standing, on the other hand, follows from the justification put forth in Brock The Brock Court acknowledged that in forming associations, members identify exactly the sort of shared interests collective standing is premised upon. tos The Court also realized that associations, having organized themselves so as to pool both economic and noneconomic resources, distinguish themselves as distinct legal actors, best suited to protecting the shared interests they serve. 109 If the Supreme Court had decided the question of the UAW's standing according to the collective model, these realizations would have supported the conclusion that the union was seeking to protect a common good (a system of unemployment insurance) that it was particularly suited to defend -because a workers' association exists and garners resources precisely to protect the well-being of workers understood as a group. These examples of applying collective standing merely suggest ways in which a court could conceive of standing problems in terms of a collective model. Although in actual circumstances the issues of whether an interest is truly shared or whether a particular association is a legitimate protector of that interest will be subtle and complex, these issues are not undecidable. The association's background and prior activities provide guides to determining the answers. 114 By awarding collective standing on the basis of criteria relevant to collectivity, courts will come closer to consistency both across cases and within doctrine -significant assets to the judicial process.
III. COLLECTIVE STANDING AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
Efforts to modify or expand the grounds for standing tend to provoke discussion about the role of the judiciary within the tripartite design of the United States government. This Part addresses the impact of collective standing on the role of the courts in a system requiring separation of the legislative and judicial functions. Subsection A argues that collective standing avoids an expansion of judicial policymaking power and, in fact, reserves the crux of this power to the legislature. Subsection B employs a brief illustration from social theory to demonstrate the need for collective standing within a democ- racy, and hence the appropriateness of judicial application of the doctrine.
A. The Separation-of-Powers Objection and a Response
Although this Note presents collective standing as a reformulation of the already existing doctrine of associational standing, critics might construe collective standing as an expansion of access to the courts. Conservatives in particular react negatively to any such expansion, and urge narrow grounds for standing as a means of protecting the separation of powers. 115 This subsection denies that collective standing allows the judiciary to encroach on legislative prerogatives.
The main argument made by advocates of a circumscription of standing runs as follows. The judiciary serves the purpose of protecting individual -and minority -rights against the will of the majority, 116 which holds sway in the legislature and the election of the executive. The courts, therefore, avoid settling disputes over value: that is the role of the "political" forums. 117 If courts grant standing to entities seeking to do more than protect predetermined individual rights, they open themselves to becoming just another political arena, and a usurper of the legislative function. 118 From this viewpoint, collective standing might be regarded as the doorway to determination of the value of collective action: a judicial fiat regarding an issue better suited to legislative deliberation. This objection, however, depends upon a disputable picture of the judiciary's role and a misguided conflation of existing collective interests and the value of encouraging the development of potential ones.
The separation-of-powers objection portrays the courts as valueneutral guardians of presupposed, inherent individual interests. 119 But in the course of resolving conflicts between individuals, the courts always decide what will count as a legally cognizable interest. And this conclusion necessarily includes a value judgment. 120 To maintain that the courts should only protect "individual interests" is already a judg-ment that will entail protection of some values at the expense of others. So it cannot be a decisive objection against collective standing that it clears the way for judicial value judgments -these already occur in practically every case.
We can, however, shift the emphasis of the original objection and attribute to it the following claim. Perhaps both the judiciary and the legislature make value judgments but they do so at different levels, employing distinct techniques. The legislature aptly decides questions of public policy and 'issues regulations accordingly; the courts decide cases of particular injury to interests and make judicial awards accordingly. The objection continues: collective interests are necessarily matters of policy and cannot be injured in a judicially cognizable sense. Therefore, any attempt, either by an individual or by an association, to vindicate collective interests through legal channels belongs to the legislative process rather than to the courts.
The response to this reformulated separation-of-powers objection is twofold. First, nothing in the nature of an interest mandates that it be lodged only in single individuals. In fact, courts already recognize interests other than those unique to individual persons, allowing corporations and associations to argue their claims, even at the expense of a particular individual's interest. 121 Thus, the sheer collectivity of an interest should not relegate it exclusively to legislative consideration. Second, collective standing treats associational claims as ones of interest, not pure policy. Having an interest denotes a private, particular attachment to the matter at hand -an already defined attachment vulnerable to injury. Collective standing delineates collective interest so as to highlight these aspects. Asserting a policy preference, on the other hand, suggests a general push for governmental support of certain kinds of interests. Whereas judicial recognition of discrete collective interests would serve to protect those interests already formulated, claimed, and injured, legislative policies in favor of collective interests would promote their development in the first place. 122 Collective standing requires only that courts address injury to formally established collective interests, not that the judiciary actively foster their development.
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B. A Coda: Collective Standing as a Practical Solution to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
Collective standing not only avoids intruding upon separation of powers, it reinforces the functional role of the judiciary in a democratic society. This section illustrates this point by suggesting that collective standing, a tool of the judiciary, presents a practical.solution to a classic theoretical problem about voting. Research in social theory has shown that democracy, understood solely as a voting mechanism, cannot fully determine a society's preferences of possible environments.123 In other words, democratic voting fails to isolate any one option as the unique social choice of the majority of voters. This failure results in the "indeterminacy" of voting. This characterization of voting as fundamentally ill-suited to reaching a definite, accurate outcome has alarming implications for democracies governed by legislatures, since legislatures rely on voting as a decisionmaking procedure. A decisionmaking procedure that fails to yield meaningful results offers little or no authoritative guidance. This section argues that operations of the judiciary, such as recognition of collective standing, prevent the indeterminacy of voting from paralyzing actual democratic government.
To redress the indeterminacy of voting, other mechanisms of choice must be used, and in actual democracies the nonlegislative branches of government serve this purpose. Because the judiciary does not utilize voting as its primacy. decisionmaking mechanism, its processes are not subject to the indeterminacy inherent in basic majority voting. 124 This subsection argues that by recognizing collectives and granting them standing, courts allow for the articulation of social options that cannot be adequately presented in a legislative forum. This articulation removes one of the constraints upon voting that social theoreticians have pinpointed as a cause of indeterminacy. Hence, the judiciary forestalls indeterminacy and facilitates legislative decisionmaking. Rather than encroach upon the legislative function, judicial grants of collective standing aid the operations of the legislature.
Economist Kenneth Arrow proved the indeterminacy of voting as a social choice mechanism. 125 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem demonstrated that no determinate social choice mechanism can be simultaneously aggregative, 126 Pareto-optimal, 127 independent of nonexistent or 123. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. 124. Although the justices and judges of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals vote on their decisions, this voting procedure is unlike the one employed in the legislature. The decisions of these courts are expressed in written opinions, not simple tallies.
125. Arrow, supra note 69, at 121-25.
126. "Aggregative," in this context, means deriving a social ordering of preferences over states of the world from a collection of individual preferences of this sort. Arrow, supra note 69, at 120.
127. The "Pareto principle" requires that "[i]f alternative x is preferred to alternative y by irrelevant alternatives, 128 and nondictatorial. 129 Arrow chose these conditions as appropriate constraints upon a voting procedure serving as social choice mechanism. But he also made a stronger claim, based on the condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives: "[t]he condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives implies that in a generalized sense all methods of social choice are of the type of voting." 130 In effect, Arrow claimed that each of the conditions places a reasonable, important constraint on any social choice mechanism, and that requiring the independence of irrelevant alternatives commits any such mechanism to the form of voting. But, taken together, the conditions prevent any given voting mechanism from coming up with determinate social choices.1 31
Weakening any one of the conditions would resolve the troublesome indeterminacy. If, however, the condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives is weakened, two things follow. First, the concept of open-ended possibility is reintroduced into social choice. Voters usually face a yes/no choice that seems to exhaust the social possibilities. Introducing previously nonexistent -and hence, irrelevant -options alleviates the tendency toward the status quo in "any historically given situation." 132 This rejuvenates the element of choice in social decisionmaking. For previously unconsidered possibilities to wend their way into the voting procedure, however, they must be articulated as concrete alternatives. Here the second result of weakening the independence of irrelevant alternatives comes into play: reasserting the force of outside alternatives requires ways of conceptualizing them for consideration. And, consequently, a niche is formed for a judiciary in the business of responding to social developments by protecting newly articulated interests. Associations and their interests, defined collectively, present a paradigmatic opportunity for this sort of activity. "[I]n the very recognition of a 'person' who is 'harmed'
